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THE HUSKY CASE: FRAUD, BANKRUPTCY,
AND VEIL PIERCING
Harvey Gelb *
ABSTRACT
A recent Supreme Court decision, Husky International Electronics, Inc.
v. Ritz, explores the meaning of the word “fraud” under a federal bankruptcy
statutory section. That section uses the term “actual fraud,” and bears upon
the question of whether a particular debt should be denied a discharge. The
Court’s approach in defining fraud affords guidance to the question of
defining fraud under other statutes. The Husky case also raised a veil
piercing issue to be dealt with on remand. That issue involved the application
of Texas statutory law precluding veil piercing in cases brought by contract
creditors unless they were victims of “actual fraud.” Recognizing the need
to protect the deserving contract or tort creditor, as well as limited liability’s
role in promoting a vibrant business environment, the author reviews
mainstream veil piercing law. The author concludes that a statute like that of
Texas, which limits veil piercing by contract creditors to cases involving
actual fraud, would be a poor model to impose on mainstream veil piercing
law. The centrality of fraud, bankruptcy law, and state veil piercing law in
American creditor-debtor relations makes the Husky case a compelling
subject.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision, Husky International v. Ritz, 1 the Supreme Court
interpreted the meaning of the word fraud, a very important word in the legal
lexicon. “Fraud” appears in various guises in different parts of speech,
including as a noun by itself; an adjective, fraudulent; a verb, defraud; or an
adverb, fraudulently. It is also found, in one form or another, in various
contexts including statutes and cases. In Husky, the phrase “actual fraud” is
used as a part of a federal bankruptcy statute that deals with denying a debtor
a discharge from a particular debt. 2 That section prohibits the discharge of an
individual debtor under Chapter 7 from any debt “for money, property,
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent
obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud . . . .” 3
* Professor and Kepler Chair in Law and Leadership Emeritus, University of Wyoming
College of Law; B.A. 1957, Harvard College; J.D. 1960, Harvard Law School. The author is
very grateful to the University of Wyoming College of Law’s continuing support spearheaded
by then Associate Dean Jim Delaney. Both the excellent work from research assistant Emma
Pinder and the outstanding assistance from the Law School’s library staff proved invaluable
for off-campus research, writing and publication.
1. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
2. See id. at 1585 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012)).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
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In the United States, fraud in its various formats occurs in everyday
expressions discussing claims or news of its perpetration. Many use the word
to describe what they consider to be shameful behavior. In Husky, the
Supreme Court rejected the very narrow interpretation of fraud that had been
rendered by the Fifth Circuit, concluded that it had a broader meaning under
the statutory section involved in the case, and, along the way to its decision,
pointed to the historic breadth of fraud. In addition, the Court discussed the
application of the “obtained by” fraud requirement.
Husky also involved issues to be resolved on remand—from the Supreme
Court to the Fifth Circuit—regarding not only the federal bankruptcy
discharge section already referred to, but also regarding the meaning of actual
fraud and direct personal benefit under a Texas veil piercing statute 4 crucial
in determining if Ritz was personally indebted to Husky. As will be discussed
more fully, Husky sought to hold Ritz personally liable on a debt it was owed
by Chrysalis Manufacturing Corporation, and also claimed that the debt was
not discharged under the applicable federal bankruptcy statute. The remand
resulted in significant analyses and holdings from the Fifth Circuit 5 and
eventually the bankruptcy court. 6
This Article considers (a) the Supreme Court’s ruling as to the meaning
of actual fraud, (b) the Court’s discussion of the “obtained by” requirement,
(c) veil piercing aspects of the case discussed by the Fifth Circuit and the
bankruptcy court on remand, including their views in light of an idiosyncratic
Texas veil piercing statute, (d) mainstream veil piercing law, and (e) whether
the Texas statute represents a good modification to veil piercing law.
Both fraud and veil piercing are fundamental topics in American law, and
Husky presents an excellent opportunity for giving them special attention.
I. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION IN HUSKY
A. ACTUAL FRAUD UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE
Chrysalis Manufacturing Corporation owed Husky almost $164,000.
Ritz, a part owner and director of Chrysalis, drained it of large sums which
could have been used to pay creditors like Husky by transferring the sums to
other entities Ritz controlled. 7 Husky sued Ritz seeking to hold him
personally responsible for Chrysalis’s debt. 8 Husky contended that Ritz’s
transfers constituted actual fraud under a Texas statute that would have
permitted recovery in certain situations from shareholders, inter alia, for a
corporate debt under a veil piercing theory. 9 Ritz filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (2017).
See In re Ritz, 832 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2016).
See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 567 B.R. 715 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).
See Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
See id. at 1593.
See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE. ANN. §§ 21.223, 21.224 (2017).
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and Husky sought to hold Ritz personally liable in that proceeding. 10 Husky
also contended that the debt owed to Husky could not be discharged in
bankruptcy because it constituted actual fraud under the statutory section
prohibiting the discharge of an individual debtor under Chapter 7 from any
debts “for money, property, services or an extension, renewal or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation,
or actual fraud . . . .” 11 Although the district court had held Ritz personally
liable for the corporate debt under Texas law, it had also held that the
discharge of Ritz’s debt was not barred under the aforementioned bankruptcy
section because the debt was not “obtained by . . . actual fraud.”12 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court ruling that the debt could be discharged
under the bankruptcy statute, but refrained from consideration of the lower
court’s position on liability under Texas law. 13
The basis of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was that a misrepresentation from
the debtor to the creditor is a necessary element of the actual fraud statutory
requirement. 14 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he term ‘actual
fraud’ in § 523(a)(2)(A) encompasses forms of fraud, like fraudulent
conveyance schemes, that can be effected without a false representation.” 15
In support of its position, the Court pointed out that before 1978, the
Bankruptcy Code prohibited the discharge of debts obtained by false
pretenses or false representations, but that Congress added actual fraud to the
list of disqualifying conduct in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 16 Stating
that “[w]hen ‘Congress acts to amend a statute we presume it intends its
amendment to have real and substantial effect,’” 17 the Court found it sensible
to presume that Congress did not intend actual fraud to mean the same thing
as a false representation. 18
The Court found, what it called, even stronger evidence for its position
in that, historically, actual fraud encompasses the conduct alleged to have
occurred in this case, i.e., a transfer scheme designed to hinder the collection
of debt. 19 Relying further on the use of history in construing the relevant
statutory section, the Court turned to defining its terms in accordance with
the “elements that the common law has defined them to include.” 20 In
examining the common law definition of actual fraud, the Court first focused
on the meaning of actual as follows:
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
See id. at 1585–86.
See id. at 1586.
Id.
See id.
Id. (citing United States v. Quality Stores, 134 S. Ct. 1395, 1401 (2014)).
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)).
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The word “actual” has a simple meaning in the context of common-law
fraud: It denotes any fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or intentional
wrong.” “Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud “in
law,” which describe acts of deception that “may exist without the
imputation of bad faith or immorality.” Thus, anything that counts as
“fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud.” 21

Stating that “‘fraud’ connotes deception or trickery generally, [but that]
the term is difficult to define more precisely,” 22 the Court wisely stuck to the
question presented by the facts of this case in determining if Ritz’s conduct
constituted fraud. The Court quoted no less an authority than the legendary
Joseph Story: “Fraud . . . being so various in its nature, and so extensive in
its application to human concerns, it would be difficult to enumerate all the
instances in which Courts of Equity will grant relief under this head.” 23 The
Court was able to conveniently follow a narrower approach saying:
There is no need to adopt a definition for all times and all circumstances
here because, from the beginning of English bankruptcy practice, courts and
legislatures have used the term “fraud” to describe a debtor’s transfer of
assets that, like Ritz’ scheme, impairs a creditor’s ability to collect the
debt. 24

In support of its position, the Court went all the way back to the use of
the word “fraudulent” in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth called the Fraudulent
Conveyances Act of 1571, of which the Court said: “In modern terms,
Parliament made it fraudulent to hide assets from creditors by giving them to
one’s family, friends or associates.” 25 The Court further explained that “[t]he
principles of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth—and even some of its language—
continue to be in wide use today,” 26 and that the “degree to which this statute
remains embedded in laws related to fraud today clarifies that the commonlaw term ‘actual fraud’ is broad enough to incorporate a fraudulent
conveyance.” 27 The Court then made the powerful point that under the
common law, fraudulent conveyances, although a fraud, do not require a
misrepresentation from the debtor to the creditor, nor are fraudulent
conveyances inducement-based fraud. The Court continued by stating that
the fraudulent conduct is “in the acts of concealment and hindrance.” 28
The Court also pointed out that under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and the
laws that followed, both the debtor and the recipient of a fraudulent
conveyance were liable for fraud. The Court explained further, “[t]hat
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1586–87.
Id. at 1587.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2018]

Fraud, Bankruptcy, and Veil Piercing

345

principle underlies the now-common understanding that a ‘conveyance
which hinders, delays or defrauds creditors shall be void as against [the
recipient] unless . . . th[at] party . . . received it in good faith and for
consideration.’” 29
The Supreme Court’s reasoning for defining “fraud” in Husky is sound
and instructive. Not only does its presumption that Congress intended its
amendment in the 1978 Code of the relevant statutory section to have a real
and substantial effect make sense, but also its use of history and the common
law is persuasive. Additionally, the Court could draw further comfort in its
interpretation of actual fraud by Ritz’s concession that fraudulent
conveyances are a form of actual fraud.30
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to confine “fraud” to situations
involving misrepresentation is consistent with the Court’s acceptance of the
word’s broader legal usage in situations, in addition to the fraudulent
conveyances statute cited in its opinion. For example, in Skilling v. United
States, 31 although the Court responded affirmatively to the question of
whether the jury improperly convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit
“honest services” wire fraud, it conceded that the word reached bribes and
kickbacks as follows: “In proscribing fraudulent deprivations of ‘the
intangible right of honest services,’ Congress intended at least to reach
schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks. Construing the honestservices statute to extend beyond that core meaning, we conclude, would
encounter a vagueness shoal.” 32
In addition, since “fraud” appears by itself or as a part of other words and
phrases in statutes dealing with various subjects and issues, the Supreme
Court’s decision to refrain from attempting to adopt a definition for all times
and circumstances is both wise and practical. For example, one statute
dealing with health care fraud speaks, inter alia, of “a scheme or artifice to
defraud any health care benefit program,” 33 and a statute dealing with bank
fraud speaks of “a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution.” 34
Furthermore, Professor Ellen S. Podgor’s excellent 1999 article Criminal
Fraud 35 illustrates many appearances of fraud in the legal lexicon. It is
prudent, therefore, to define fraud when it appears in its various guises in
legislation in accordance with the normal process of statutory interpretation.
Moreover, “fraud” is not simply a seldom used legal term like
“estoppel” or “life estate,” but rather exists in common parlance to describe
various kinds of shameful conduct. Many non-lawyers would be surprised to
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1588.
See id. at n.2.
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
Id. at 2907 (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 1344.
See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. Rev. 729 (1999).
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hear the contention that only a misrepresentation gives birth to fraud as the
word is understood in the everyday use of language. Of course, students of
the law know that the interpretation of statutory words may turn on more than
common usage. Still, it is comforting that the expectations of people subject
to an anti-fraud law should not be disappointed by the Supreme Court’s
Husky decision that a misrepresentation is not required in determining that
the behavior under attack is fraudulent.
Another example, a Report by the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, a worldwide occupational fraud study, 36 illustrates the
considerable breadth of the meaning of “fraud.” The Report lists three
primary categories of occupational fraud: asset misappropriation, corruption,
and financial statement fraud. 37 The Glossary of Terminology in the Report
gives a definition for each term:
Asset misappropriation: A scheme in which an employee steals or misuses
the employing organization’s resources (e.g., theft of company cash, false
billing schemes, or inflated expense reports)
Corruption: A scheme in which an employee misuses his or her influence
in a business transaction in a way that violates his or her duty to the
employer in order to gain a direct or indirect benefit (e.g., schemes
involving bribery or conflicts of interest)
Financial statement fraud: A scheme in which an employee intentionally
causes a misstatement or omission of material information in the
organization’s financial reports (e.g., recording fictitious revenues,
understating reported expenses, or artificially inflating reported assets) 38

The Report in Figure 3’s fraud tree also lists examples of each type of
fraud. 39 This broad usage of “fraud” by an organization of this type certainly
gives added credence to the Supreme Court’s observation of its scope in
Husky and in the Story reference in that case. 40 It also supports the wisdom
of Justice Sotomayor’s refusal to define fraud for all purposes, as well as her
conclusion that the term is not limited to misrepresentation cases under the
bankruptcy statutory section under consideration. In determining the
meaning of “fraud” (or words or phrases of which it is a component) in each
of its statutory habitats, judges—going forward—will need to employ
appropriate rules of interpretation as the Supreme Court did in Husky.

36. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2016).
37. See id. at 10.
38. Id. at 90.
39. See id. at 11.
40. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586–87 (2016).
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B. THE “OBTAINED BY” REQUIREMENT
Notwithstanding the concession that fraudulent conveyances are a form
of actual fraud, Ritz pressed ahead with quibbles about statutory
redundancies that would result from the broad view of actual fraud ultimately
adopted by the Court. 41 Easily rejecting those arguments, the Court turned to
the more significant issue under the statute as to whether the debt was “for
money, property, services, or . . . credit . . . obtained by . . . actual fraud . . .
.” 42 Ritz contended that at the end of a fraudulent conveyance there was no
debt that could be said to result from or be traceable to the fraud, and that
actual fraud should not be interpreted to encompass forms of fraud
incompatible with the “obtained by” requirement. 43 This issue had been
ignored by the Fifth Circuit which thought the case resolved by its
interpretation of actual fraud as requiring a misrepresentation.
The Supreme Court offered its perspective on the matter as follows:
It is of course true that the transferor does not “obtain[n]” debts in a
fraudulent conveyance. But the recipient of the transfer—who, with the
requisite intent, also commits fraud—can “obtain[n]” assets “by” his or her
participation in the fraud. If that recipient later files for bankruptcy, any
debts “traceable to” the fraudulent conveyance will be nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(2)(A). 44

The Court expressly remanded it to the Fifth Circuit to consider “whether
the debt to Husky was ‘obtained by’ Ritz’ asset-transfer scheme.” 45
As this Article will further explain, this perspective is off-course in
resolving the “obtained by” issue. In this case, Ritz will only become a debtor
to Husky if Chrysalis’s veil is pierced to hold Ritz personally liable and not
because he is the recipient of a transfer constituting a fraudulent conveyance.
The significance of the fraudulent conveyance statute is that it aids in
providing a definition of fraud.
II. REMAND
A. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
On remand, the Fifth Circuit logically turned to the question of whether
Ritz owed a debt to Husky under Texas law because, if not, there would be
no debt to discharge and therefore the case would be moot. 46 The court held
Husky’s theory—Ritz’s liability for Chrysalis’s debt—to be legally viable

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1588–89.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
See Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585–86.
Id. at 1589 (citations omitted).
See id. at n.3.
See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 832 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2016).
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under Texas veil piercing law. 47 In so holding, the court noted that Texas
recognizes various legal theories for disregarding the corporate form but
pointed to a Texas statute which limits veil piercing in that a shareholder of
a corporation generally may not be held liable to the corporation or its
obligees with respect to:
any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or
arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, beneficial owner,
subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the
basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other
similar theory[.] 48

The Fifth Circuit further explained:
However, the shareholder may be held personally liable for the business’s
obligations “if the obligee demonstrates that the . . . beneficial owner . . .
caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did
perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal
benefit of the . . . beneficial owner.” 49

The Fifth Circuit referred to an earlier bankruptcy court decision in
Husky, holding that such fraud required a misrepresentation followed by a
district court rejection of that position. 50 That rejection was based on a
previous Fifth Circuit case where it had been “held that other conduct could
satisfy the standard of ‘dishonesty of purpose and intent to deceive’ necessary
to show actual fraud.” 51 The district court further held that a fraudulent
transfer under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) is
committed with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud, and thus, would
satisfy the actual fraud requirement of the Texas veil piercing statute, a legal
conclusion with which the Fifth Circuit agreed. 52 In explaining its position,
the Fifth Circuit stated that “in the context of piercing the corporate veil,
actual fraud is not equivalent to the tort of fraud. Instead, in that context,
actual fraud involves ‘dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive.’” 53 The
court further held:
[E]stablishing that a transfer is fraudulent under the actual fraud prong of
TUFTA is sufficient to satisfy the actual fraud requirement of veil-piercing
because a transfer that is made “with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor,” necessarily “involves ‘dishonesty of purpose or intent
to deceive.’” 54

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 566.
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (2017).
In re Ritz, 832 F.3d at 566 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b)).
See id.
Id. (citing Spring St. Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 442 (5th Cir. 2013)).
See id. at 566–67.
Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, both the Supreme Court in analyzing “fraud” under the relevant
federal statute and the Fifth Circuit analyzing the term under Texas veil
piercing law rejected the restrictive notion that “fraud” encompassed only a
case involving misrepresentation and, in particular, recognized certain
fraudulent conveyance schemes as coming within the scope of the relevant
federal bankruptcy and state veil piercing statutory sections. Still, the Fifth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court and ultimately to the
bankruptcy court for additional fact-finding in an attempt to assess whether
Ritz’s conduct satisfied the actual fraud prong of TUFTA and was for Ritz’s
“direct personal benefit.” 55 The Fifth Circuit took the position that if the court
made the necessary adverse findings regarding Ritz, he would be liable for
Chrysalis’s debt to Husky under the Texas veil piercing statute.56 The Fifth
Circuit further stated that if there is a debt, then the bankruptcy court must
address whether it should be denied a discharge consistent with the Supreme
Court’s opinion in this case. 57
B. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
Responding to the Fifth Circuit on remand, the bankruptcy court
considered whether Ritz’s conduct reflected the requisite intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud in order to satisfy the actual fraud prong of TUFTA. 58
Explaining its reliance on circumstantial evidence, the bankruptcy court
indicated that the Fifth Circuit, along with many courts, allowed the use of a
“badge of fraud” analysis. 59 TUFTA itself listed a number of specific badges
such as “the transfer was to an insider,” “the transfer was concealed,” “the
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made.” 60 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that after an
extensive badges of fraud analysis, the bankruptcy court “unequivocally
[made] a finding that the Debtor’s transfers of the $1,161,279.90 were made
with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Husky under TUFTA.” 61
The bankruptcy court also decided that the actual fraud was perpetrated
primarily for Ritz’s direct personal benefit. In doing so, the court referred,
inter alia, to (a) the Debtor’s admission that a transfer of Chrysalis’s funds
to a company for which he had a personal guarantee would be a personal
benefit to him, (b) the Debtor’s transfers of over $677,000 to one company
which owed a debt for a one-million-dollar loan Debtor had guaranteed, and

55. Id. at 569.
56. See id. (This latter point, however, does seem textually at odds with the Texas statute, which

only seems to remove an impediment to holding Ritz liable and not mandating that outcome.).
57. See id.
58. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 567 B.R. 715, 739 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).
59. Id. at 740.
60. Id. (where a longer list of badges of fraud appears).
61. Id. at 755.
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(c) transfers from Chrysalis to continue the businesses of the Debtor’s other
companies instead of paying Chrysalis’s creditors. 62
The bankruptcy court then turned to the issue of whether Ritz’s debt to
Husky was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) as a “debt for money to
the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud.” 63 The court, referring specifically to
transfers to Debtor-Creditor Entities, held that money was obtained by Ritz. 64
Pointing to its “badges of fraud” analysis, the court concluded that the debtor
committed actual fraud when he transferred the $1,161,279.90 from
Chrysalis to the Debtor-Controlled Entities. 65 The bankruptcy court reasoned
that Ritz’s personal debt arose due to the Debtor-Controlled Entities
obtaining the funds from his fraudulent conduct because the Texas veil
piercing statute imposed personal liability on the debtor for the debt to
Husky. The court explained, “[t]here is no question that the creation of this
personal obligation is directly traceable to—i.e., resulted from—the Debtor’s
fraudulent actions in orchestrating the transfers of $1,161,279.90 out of
Chrysalis’s account and into the accounts of the Debtor-Controlled
Entities.” 66 Alluding to the Supreme Court’s language in Husky that “debts
‘traceable to’ the fraudulent conveyance,’ [are] non-dischargeable under §
523(a)(2)(A),” 67 the bankruptcy court found Ritz’s debt owed to Husky to be
non-dischargeable. 68
III. VEIL PIERCING
As a longtime student of veil piercing law, 69 I was moved by the Husky
case to review the mainstream piercing law and consider whether a statute
modeled after the idiosyncratic Texas veil piercing statute, which severely
limits the rights of contract creditors, would be a wise addition. In presenting
this review, I do not pretend to have found complete uniformity and clarity
in veil piercing law among the various jurisdictions in our country, but I can
be comfortable at least in setting forth certain dominant judicial themes. It is
important to note too that this review is focused on the efforts of creditors to
engage in veil piercing to collect debts rather than other occasions on which
the topic of piercing may come up—such as in service of process cases.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 759–61 (noting the court’s personal benefit discussion).
Id. at 761–62.
See id. at 762.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
The author wrote the book HARVEY GELB, PERSONAL CORPORATE LIABILITY, A GUIDE
FOR PLANNERS, LITIGATORS AND CREDITORS’ COUNSEL (1991), which includes a lengthy first
chapter on veil piercing containing considerable analysis on the subject, as well as several articles
dealing with piercing.
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A. ABUSE OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY PRIVILEGE
The limited liability privilege is granted to owners of certain enterprises,
such as corporations or limited liability companies, to encourage investment.
“The common purpose of statutes providing limited shareholder liability is
to offer a valuable incentive to business investment.” 70 Thus, in general, a
person can transfer assets to and become an owner of a limited liability entity
without losing assets uncommitted to the venture. Persons are encouraged
thereby to take risks, but on a limited basis. This privilege should appeal to
passive investors who are willing to place at least some of their assets into
enterprises controlled by others. But it should also be attractive to investors
who participate in the control of an enterprise.
While much good may come from the existence of the limited liability
privilege, it may be abused, and when that happens courts have shown a
readiness, however reluctant, to counter the abuse. To take an extreme
example, suppose a person who organizes and operates a limited liability
entity neither provides, nor allows it to retain, any assets available for the
payment of creditors, and permits it to purchase no insurance. Suppose
further that a customer is seriously injured because of the entity’s negligent
high-risk operations, and that the customer obtains an uncollectible judgment
of $50,000 against the entity for her injury. Is justice served by passing this
loss to the victim, and indirectly to others to whom she is indebted because
of her injury, or even to the society at large that charitably helps her meet
needs traceable to it? Or, suppose the same entity purchased inventory for
which it has not paid and the seller has not agreed to look only to the entity
for payment. Is justice served by allowing its owner-operator to hide behind
the veil of limited liability? In either case—is the public policy of stimulating
investment, which underlies the limited liability privilege, being served?
Carried to absurd lengths, would the limited liability privilege allow pseudoinvestors to accomplish through fraud or other wrongful conduct the transfer
or retention of wealth for their own benefit at the expense of their creditors?
To counter abuse of the limited liability privilege, many courts have used
veil piercing doctrines in recognition of the fact that, in some situations, blind
acceptance of the privilege will permit the triumph of injustice, inequity,
fraud, or the like of a serious enough nature to warrant piercing.
B. SYMBOLIC TERMS, APPROPRIATE TARGETS, AND GENERAL
TESTS
Veil piercing cases sometimes contain colorful or symbolic terms such
as “sham,” “instrumentality,” “alter ego,” or “dummy” to reflect
characteristics of entities whose veils are to be disregarded. 71 While the terms
are themselves conclusory in nature and generally of little analytical use, they
70. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
71. See GELB, supra note 69, at § 1.2.
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form part of the vocabulary used in particular jurisdictions and their use must
be understood in various contexts, say, for example, by an appellate advocate
who responds to a judge asking her to present her alter ego argument.
In cases where creditors—whose underlying claims stem from the tort or
contract liability of the entity—seek to pierce its veil, the proper targets are
generally those who by virtue of their control are responsible for the conduct
triggering the piercing decision. 72
Two of the guiding tests, neither of which is written in language entirely
understandable on its face and either of which appears with some frequency,
though by no means universally, in cases involving piercing claims, may be
set forth substantially in the forms that follow. Test 1 may be referred to as
the “unity of interest and ownership test,” and it states that to pierce the
corporate veil, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) [T]here is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the parties who compose it no longer
exist, and (2) circumstances are such that adherence to the fiction of a
separate corporation would promote injustice or inequitable
circumstances. 73

Test 2 may be referred to as the “instrumentality test” and may be stated
largely as follows:
The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency, proof
of three elements: (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control,
but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as
to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its
own; (2) that such control must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive
legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of [the] plaintiff’s
legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. 74

C. GUIDING FACTORS
In addition, courts often set forth lists of factors as guidance in piercing
decisions. 75 The lists do not purport to be exclusive, may be of varying sizes
72. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS,
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 20:13 (2017).
73. Steiner Elec. Co. v. Maniscalco, 51 N.E.3d 45, 46, 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). For a similar
example of this test, see Semmaterials, L.P. v. Alliance Asphalt, Inc., 2008 WL 161797, at *4 (D.
Idaho Jan. 15, 2008).
74. Batoh v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 296, 323 (D. Conn. 2016). For a similar
statement of this test, see John Knox Village v. Fortis Const. Co., LLC, 449 S.W.3d 68, 76 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2014).
75. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 493 (2016). See GELB, supra note 69, at § 1.4. For further discussion of the use of factors,
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and content, and are rather loosely applied as guidelines without any
requirement that all or any particular factors be present to justify piercing. 76
It is important too, as reflected in the second prong of Test 1 or with more
detail in the second prong of Test 2, that piercing in favor of creditors is used
to prevent injustice or inequity or the like of sufficient gravity to overcome
the normally expected judicial reluctance to pierce.
Continental v. Symons 77 provides a good vehicle for reviewing several
aspects of mainstream veil piercing law for purposes of this Article. First, it
contains a list of guiding factors (referred to as the “Aronson factors”) under
Indiana’s veil piercing law, factors which to a considerable degree appear in
veil piercing analyses under the law of other states. Second, it provides a
good basis for the discussion of some of the important issues which may arise
in veil piercing cases. Third, like Husky, Continental is a contract creditor
pursuing a veil piercing claim.
In 1998, IGF Insurance Company (IGF) purchased a crop insurance
business from Continental. 78 In 2002, while still indebted to Continental for
more than $25 million in connection with that purchase, IGF resold the crop
insurance business for more than $40 million. 79 But the Symons Group
(Gordon, Alan, and Douglas) that controlled IGF structured the sale so that
most of the proceeds were siphoned into other companies the group
controlled as follows: $9 million to Symons International Group Inc. and
Goran Capital Inc. (which were IGF parent companies) in exchange for noncompete agreements and $15 million to Granite Reinsurance Co. in exchange
for a reinsurance treaty. 80 Only $16.5 million of the purchase price went to
IGF. 81 Continental sued for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer. 82
District court findings that the non-compete and reinsurance agreements
constituted fraudulent diversions of the purchase money for the crop
insurance business were upheld by the circuit court, 83 but the court expressly
avoided deciding if Alan and Gordon’s estate (which was substituted for
Gordon after his death) were liable as transferees under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 84
Although the appeal focused on several questions for review, the
discussion here is mainly limited to the bases for the court finding Alan
see Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYO. L. REV. 551, 556–58 (2009)
[hereinafter Gelb, Limited Liability Policy].
76. See Continental, 817 F.3d at 993–94; GELB, supra note 69, at § 1.4; Gelb, Limited Liability
Policy, supra note 75, at 556–58.
77. See Continental, 817 F.3d at 993.
78. See id. at 981–82.
79. See id. at 982.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 992–93.
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Symons and the Estate of Gordon Symons subject to “veil piercing” liability
(at times characterized by the court as “alter ego” liability). 85
In dealing with veil piercing liability under the pertinent Indiana law, the
Seventh Circuit noted that “Indiana courts hesitate to pierce the corporate veil
[but they] will do so to prevent fraud or injustice to a third party.” 86 The court
stated that the alter ego analysis in Indiana proceeds along the so-called
“Aronson factors” which include:
(1) undercapitalization; (2) absence of corporate records; (3) fraudulent
representation by corporation shareholders or directors; (4) use of the
corporation to promote fraud, injustice or illegal activities; (5) payment by
the corporation of individual obligations; (6) commingling of assets and
affairs; (7) failure to observe required corporate formalities; or (8) other
shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, controlling, or manipulating the
corporate form. 87

A look at the above Aronson factors and similar ones, 88 the like of which
appear in many veil piercing cases, would indicate that evidence regarding
these factors may well be probative of financial irresponsibility or
misbehavior, information on who was in control of the limited liability entity,
and whether the defendant had wronged the plaintiff in a way serious enough
to justify veil piercing. And while piercing terminology and factors are not
completely uniform across the United States, Continental, in its use of the
Aronson factors, offers a good example of a mainstream judicial approach.
The Seventh Circuit pointed to some additional factors (the “Smith
factors”) used where a court is asked to decide if two or more affiliated
corporations should be treated as a single entity, a question which also came
up in Continental: “whether similar corporate names were used; whether
there were common principal corporate officers, directors, and employees;
whether the business purposes of the corporations were similar; and whether
the corporations were located in the same offices and used the same telephone
numbers and business cards.” 89
D. CONTRACT CREDITORS —THE CAVEAT EMPTOR SHRUG
Before proceeding with its veil piercing analysis in accord with Indiana’s
lists of relevant factors, the Seventh Circuit blocked an effort by defendants
to administer a knockout blow to Continental’s veil piercing claim.
85. The veil piercing proceeding against Douglas was stayed because he was in a bankruptcy
proceeding. See id.
86. Id. at 993.
87. Id. at 993–94.
88. For a similar list of factors, see Steiner Elec. Co. v. Maniscalco, 51 N.E.3d 45, 56–57 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016). In addition, for references regarding list of factors, see GELB, supra note 69, at §
1.4.
89. Continental, 817 F.3d at 994. For further discussion of the Aronson and Smith factors in
Continental, see infra text accompanying notes 96, 97.
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The defendants argue as a threshold matter that this case lacks the sort of
injustice necessary to warrant a veil-piercing inquiry. Caveat emptor, they
shrug. Continental knew what it was getting into when it sold its cropinsurance business to IGF. It was never misled. That IGF can’t pay makes
this merely “an unsatisfied judgment” and no reason to pierce the corporate
veil.
We’re not persuaded. Yes, it’s true that Continental was a sophisticated
market actor; any deal can turn sour and sometimes judgments go
unsatisfied. But none of this makes it just or fair for the Symons family to
have structured the later sale of the business to Acceptance to syphon assets
away from IGF to evade the debt to Continental, which is what the
noncompetes and reinsurance in this deal accomplished. If nothing else,
Continental had reason to believe that IGF wouldn’t dump the cropinsurance business for less than half its value. We think this constitutes
injustice to a third party. 90

The court’s rejection of the caveat emptor shrug as eliminating what it
perceived to be an injustice to Continental on the facts of this case is entirely
appropriate. It is difficult, perhaps absurd, to construe Continental’s
contractual intention to effectively surrender its right to collect from IGF.
Moreover, the court’s view that an injustice has been done to Continental is
relevant in light of the second prong of the Indiana veil piercing test. 91 In
another statement relevant to that prong, the court refers to fraudulent
behavior by the Symonses. 92
E. FACTORS ANALYSIS
Before considering the court of appeals’ analysis and application of veil
piercing factors in reviewing the district court decision to hold Alan and
Gordon personally liable, it may be useful to bear in mind two points.
First, there is the direct or indirect control of Symons family members
over a host of entities, which the court even referred to as a corporate
empire. 93 Significantly, the court of appeals approved the district court’s
findings that “‘Alan, Doug, and Gordon Symons ignored, controlled, and
manipulated the corporate forms’ of IGF, IGF Holdings, Symons
International, Granite Re, Superior, Pafco, and Goran, and ‘operated the
corporations as a single business enterprise such that these entities were mere
instrumentalities of the Symons family.’” 94
Second, the existence of controlled entities not only opens the door for
possible questionable dealings between or among controlling parties and the
entities, but also between or among the entities, dealings that could render a
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Continental, 817 F.3d at 994 (citations omitted).
For the Indiana test, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra text at note 98.
See Continental, 817 F.3d at 995.
Id. at 994.
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limited liability entity debtor unable to meet obligations. Questionable
dealings, therefore, must be examined to determine if the limited liability
privilege conferred on the debtor entity has been abused by those in control.
Examples of examinations involving controlled entity dealings appear in
connection with circuit court references to commingling. 95
In sustaining the district court’s alter ego findings as not clearly wrong,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals approved the trial judge’s use of factors
identified in Aronson and Smith in determining if Alan and Gordon used their
control over their corporate empire to enrich themselves at the expense of
Continental. 96 In doing so, the court rejected defendants’ claim that use of
factors from both cases involved an improper blending, stating that the
Aronson factors are not necessarily exhaustive, and thus the court
demonstrated an unsurprising flexibility in the utilization of factors in a
piercing case. 97 The court referred to the lower court’s evaluations regarding
undercapitalization, fraudulent representation by corporation shareholders or
directors, corporate formalities, commingling assets, and common address as
the basis for the lower court conclusion “that the Symonses used their control
over the Goran-related companies to fraudulently avoid satisfying the debt to
Continental.” 98
Regarding undercapitalization, the appellate court pointed to the lower
court’s evaluation as follows:
The judge did not find the companies undercapitalized for the purposes of
the Aronson test because “[t]he adequacy of capital is to be measured as of
the time of a corporation’s formation.” Nevertheless, the judge noted that
the fact that almost all of the Symons companies were undercapitalized as
of 1999 “cannot be ignored.” 99

One can understand a court attempting to wriggle free of an arbitrary
freezing of an undercapitalization determination to the time of a company’s
formation. There are cases which examine undercapitalization as a
continuing issue. 100 Indeed the capitalization of a corporation, along with the
other assets it has available for conducting its business and paying creditors,
may reflect on whether it is being operated in a financially responsible way
and worthy of the limited liability privilege. In addition, liability insurance
carried by an entity may be especially relevant to the financial responsibility
issue where a tort victim is the creditor.101 And, of course, the expansion or
contraction of a business or the hazards it faces may require the reassessment
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See infra text accompanying notes 105, 118.
See Continental, 817 F.3d at 995.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
See Steiner Elec. Co. v. Maniscalco, 51 N.E.3d 45, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); see also Coughlin
Const. Co., Inc. v. Nu-Tec Indus., Inc., 755 N.W.2d 867, 876 (N.D. 2008).
101. See Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 309 (8th Cir. 1992).
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of the adequacy of its capital. 102 The point is that veil piercing involves a factintensive inquiry done in a realistic way and should not be hamstrung by illconceived rigidity.
A piercing case decided under Illinois law in 2016 furnishes a good
example of a court taking a continuing view of the adequacy of capital. 103
There, the court not only pointed to the failure of the piercing defendant to
contribute unencumbered capital to the corporation, it also referred to
testimony of a forensic accountant who reviewed various records for a fiveyear period and testified that the corporation whose veil was under attack was
undercapitalized, had consistently and increasingly negative equity and
income over the time period he reviewed, and 2004–2008 tax returns showing
negative retained earnings each year. The court concluded that the
undercapitalization factor weighed in favor of piercing. 104
As to commingling assets, the appellate court in Continental pointed to
the lower court’s evaluation as follows:
The companies all made extensive use of intercompany loans, purchases,
sales, securities, real estate, mortgages, and other investments. There was
vertical overlap between IGF and IGF Holdings in their payroll. In 2001
IGF, Superior, and Pafco were all incurring significant operating losses
while their holding companies made over $40 million from the operating
companies in management and service agreements. 105

Such commingling poses serious problems for creditors. It may impair
or destroy the viability of a limited liability entity and its capacity to pay
debts, thereby thwarting the reasonable expectations of creditors. What
makes commingling of special concern is that creditors may encounter
significant difficulty and expense in searching for improper transactions.
Regarding corporate formalities, the court referred to the findings, inter
alia, of the judge below that the “corporate formalities maintained by the
Symons-controlled companies were entirely ‘cosmetic’”; 106 that “Goran and
Symons International boards met at the same time and place on [eighteen]
separate occasions between March 1997 and May 2001”; 107 and that “Alan
Symons was the principal representative of IGF, IGF Holdings, Symons
International, Goran, and Granite Re during negotiations with Acceptance”
(the latter was the purchaser of the crop insurance business). 108 Under the
title “Common Address,” it was pointed out that the lower court referred to

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Atlas Const. Co. v. Slater, 746 P.2d 352, 356 (Wyo. 1987).
See Steiner, 51 N.E.3d at 57–58.
See id. at 58.
Continental Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 995 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 994–95.
Id. at 995.
Id.
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the fact that a number of the Symons enterprises shared an Indianapolis
address. 109
Factors that are set forth, involving the observance of formalities which
bear only upon the attention given to technical ones, may not deserve to be
accorded much probative weight as guidelines. It is a matter of common
knowledge that many closely held enterprises generally do not follow
technical formalities, and it is unlikely that such behavior indicates unworthy
conduct harmful to creditors. In addition, it is hard to see the significance in
this case of the “common address” finding. On the other hand, the term
“formalities” may be construed by some as broad enough to include practices
that could bear on a veil piercing decision. For example, if records are not
properly kept by entities, the opportunity for creditors to detect improper,
unjust, or fraudulent behavior by controlling persons may be unfairly reduced
and therefore relevant to their claims. In addition, lack of documentation of
certain transactions, such as loans to controlling persons, may be important
in making piercing determinations and may be thought by some to be
encompassed within the term formalities. Finally, some of the guiding
factors, including inattention to formalities, may be useful in determining
which persons exercise control over or perpetrate the wrongful behavior
which justifies or even necessitates a decision to pierce.
It should be noted, however, that the role of Alan Symons as
representative of various parties, while likely relevant in the piercing
analysis, seems semantically misplaced as an issue of formality.
Regarding the factor entitled “[f]raudulent representation by corporation
shareholders or directors,” the judge below found they had been made by the
Symons family and certain others to regulatory agencies and the general
public, “in particular misrepresentations to the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation.” 110
Such representations are of concern under Aronson’s third and fourth
factors, and are, therefore, relevant in the Indiana piercing analysis.
Additionally, their existence clashes sharply with defendants’ wish to use the
fact that because the Goran companies are regulated businesses, they could
not be considered as controlled as one enterprise. The appellate court shot
down this argument saying: “the fact that the insurance industry is heavily
regulated changes nothing of significance here. Unless the defendants can
show that the regulatory requirements prevented the Symonses from
manipulating their companies (and they can’t), this argument doesn’t get off
the ground.” 111 Not only do the false representations undercut or eliminate
any benefit to creditors, but also the comforting veneer of regulation and
reports may give undue legitimacy and prestige to some debtors in the eyes
109. Id.
110. Id. at 994.
111. Id. at 996.
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of creditors—thus engendering a misplaced reliance on undeserving
companies.
The defendants also argued that the Goran companies could not be
considered controlled as one enterprise because some were publicly traded.112
It has been conventionally and conveniently assumed that veil piercing is a
remedy unlikely to be applied to publicly held entities. Indeed, in an
important study published in 1991, Professor Robert B. Thompson reported
that in his data set, no piercing occurred with respect to publicly held
companies, and that this fact reflected “the different role that limited liability
plays in larger corporations.” 113 He explained further as follows:
All corporations can use the corporate form to allocate risk. Limited liability
performs the additional function in larger corporations of facilitating the
transferability of shares and making possible organized securities markets
with the increased liquidity and diversification benefits that these markets
make possible. The absence of these market-related benefits for close
corporations explains, in part, why courts are more willing to pierce the veil
of close corporations, but a piercing result still requires a combination of
other factors. 114

The court in Continental, in rejecting the defendants’ argument,
emphasized that no rule precluded piercing the veil of public companies. 115
While acknowledging that veil piercing is usually applied to closely-held
corporations, the court explained that that has more to do with the ease of
abusing the corporate form in such a corporation rather than anything else.
The court, citing authority for not ruling out public corporation piercing,
noted that it has happened before. 116 The court also said that if there were a
rule against public company piercing, it would be justified by a concern for
innocent third-party shareholders, but that Goran and Symons have been
delisted from the NASDAQ, “so that’s of limited salience.” 117
Because the law relating to veil piercing in the case of public corporations
lacks development, it is premature to discuss it for purposes of the review of
mainstream veil piercing law undertaken in this Article. This does not mean
that this topic is unimportant. Quite the contrary.
The court supported its climactic moment of affirming the court below
in holding Alan and the Estate of Gordon liable under alter ego theory by
reiterating its dissatisfaction with the respect for formalities shown, and more
significantly with a telling reference to commingling: “[a]ssets were
112. See id.
113. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.

REV. 1036, 1047 (1991).
114. Id. at 1047–48.
115. See Continental, 817 F.3d at 996.
116. See id.
117. Id. For an additional case involving the issue of veil piercing of a public corporation, see
First Nat’l Bank of Omaha v. iBeam Sols., LLC., 61 N.E.3d 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
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commingled—indeed, the corporations all seem to have raided one another
with some degree of impunity. Symons family members received millions of
dollars in no-interest, unsecured loans from their companies.” 118 And the
court added: “[f]inally, Alan was the principal agent of all the relevant
companies and the architect of the sale.” 119
F. IS THE TEXAS VEIL PIERCING STATUTE A GOOD MODEL TO
FOLLOW?
The Texas veil piercing statute featured in Husky discriminates against
creditors seeking to collect claims based on contractual debts. This raises the
fundamental question of whether the application of mainstream veil piercing
law as described in this Article should be limited by a requirement modeled
after the Texas statute. For the following reasons, this Article argues that the
Texas requirement in contract debtor cases is a mistake.
1) This statute precludes action by many contract creditors such as
workers, suppliers, and consumers who are unable to protect themselves
against potential payment defaults by limited liability entities. There are, of
course, some exceptional situations like bank loans where creditors can
protect themselves. In those relatively few cases where special bargaining is
possible, that may well be considered among the equities of the piercing case.
2) Veil piercing, as it occurs in mainstream law, is imposed on persons
who used their control over limited liability entities to unfairly abuse their
creditors. It thus serves as a deterrent to misuse the limited liability privilege
and affords a remedy to deserving creditors.
3) Using a limited liability entity in a financially irresponsible way is
often one type of conduct unfair to the creditor of the entity. In a broader
sense, such behavior has harmful effects not only on its victims, but also on
business activity in general.
4) Yet, if the limited liability privilege is to be a meaningful incentive
to investment, it must not be too easily undermined by litigation or the threat
of litigation. For example, the use of financial irresponsibility as a basis for
veil piercing cannot be based on nitpicking. Creditors must not be encouraged
to believe that they can win cases or extract settlements by merely producing
evidence of small errors in financial judgement. The degree of financial
irresponsibility to justify piercing should be serious if the limited liability
privilege is to serve its purpose.
5) Some may complain of the lack of mathematical certitude in
determining the required degree of irresponsibility needed to justify a
decision to pierce. But making judgements about matters of degree is not
uncommon in the resolution of cases.

118. Continental, 817 F.3d at 996.
119. Id.
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6) The possibility of veil piercing sensitizes many attorneys and clients
to the need for proper behavior. That possibility should not be undermined
by a statute like that of Texas.
7) Although the situations that can be classified as actual fraud are not
defined by the Texas statute, it seems certain that the phrase will be
interpreted more narrowly than the mainstream veil piercing approach
exemplified by typically used broader judicial terms, such as those contained
in Test 1 120 of this Article, which refers to the promotion of injustice or
inequitable circumstances, and Test 2, 121 which speaks of control “used by
the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in
contravention of [the] plaintiff’s legal rights.” 122 Not only does the scope of
the term “actual fraud” appear to seriously shrink the possibility of successful
veil piercing, but the Fifth Circuit reasonably refers to the Texas statute as
requiring “dishonesty of purpose and intent to deceive,” 123 a further
limitation and a serious one, not seen as part of traditional veil piercing law.
It is also evident that a creditor will face difficulties of proof respecting issues
of purpose and intent. Veil piercing should not depend on proof and findings
of evil purpose, or intent on the part of its targeted defendants. Historic veil
piercing tests, lists of factors, and mainstream judicial decisions do not go
that far. The policy behind the granting of the privilege of limited liability is
well served by looking at what the facts show about whether it is fair to leave
certain creditors holding the bag on certain debts. Additionally, the phrase
“direct personal benefit” is not without ambiguity, and poses a further
unfamiliar obstacle to veil piercing.
The Texas veil piercing statute leaves too many legitimate creditors,
whose claims stem from contractual obligations, without a veil piercing
remedy. Veil piercing is a venerable and respectable judicial remedy which
has helped creditors collect on debts arising from contracts or torts. This
remedy should not be unreasonably eroded.
CONCLUSION
It is understandable that Congress would use a narrow phrase such as
“actual fraud” in describing one of the grounds to defeat the discharge of
certain debts in a bankruptcy proceeding. After all, an important bankruptcy
law policy is to give relief to an honest but unfortunate debtor. 124 But the
Texas veil piercing statute would show compassion to many potential debtors
who may not be considered unfortunate, at least in any economic sense, while
it is not sufficiently supportive of abused creditors. Nor does it support the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See supra text accompanying note 73.
See supra text accompanying note 74.
Batoh v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 296, 323 (D. Conn. 2016).
Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 832 F.3d 560, 566–67 (5th Cir. 2016).
See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 366 (2007).
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purpose of the limited liability privilege. For veil piercing purposes,
mainstream judicial doctrines that challenge broad forms of misbehavior
including fraud, inequity, and injustice are properly considered by courts.

